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THE FACTS ON ABORTION
Everyone knows the basic facts about abortion. Almost universally illegal before 1972, abortions were unheard of except for
rare, and very dangerous, operations by unqualified "back alley"
abortionists. The Court's 1972 decision in Roe v. Wade was like a
thunderbolt; no one expected the Justices to overturn laws favored
by the anti-abortion majority. Since then, opposition to Roe has
mostly come from men, particularly Catholics because the church
has always considered abortion tantamount to murder.
As a new book titled The Abortion Question ' reveals, none of
the assertions in the preceding paragraph are true. Abortions were
neither universally illegal nor particularly rare before 1972. A
number of states, most notably New York, had recently liberalized
their abortion laws in a way that purported to retain limitations but
actually required only that a woman find a cooperative doctor.
Even before these liberalized laws, doctors performed numerous
abortions by making a "determination" that a woman's life might
be endangered by the pregnancy. Indeed, abortions were extremely
widespread before 1972, almost as much so as in the period immediately after Roe. For example, Kinsey found in 1958 that one out of
four American women had had an abortion. Other estimates suggest that roughly one million abortions per year were performed
prior to legalization.2
Moreover, Roe was neither an unexpected thunderbolt nor an
example of life-appointed judges overriding majority views. A
number of lower court judges had correctly anticipated Roe by ruling that Griswold required recognition of the right to an abortion.
By the early 1970s, a substantial majority of Americans believed
that abortion should be legal under at least some circumstances.
For example, in 1972 about eighty percent believed that abortion
should be legal if the woman was raped or if the baby might have a
serious defect; half of the public thought abortion was acceptable if
the woman could not afford to support a child. The Court may
have gone somewhat farther than the majority of the population,
I. The book, H. RODMAN, B. SARVIS & J. BoNAR, THE ABORTION QUESTION (1987)
[hereinafter ABORTION QUESTION], is available from the Columbia University Press for $27.
It provides a remarkably thorough and even-handed summary of the voluminous research on
abortion.
2. ABORTION QUESTION, supra note I, at 23.
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but the difference was not huge, and the Court may have been closer
than the state legislatures to popular opinion.
Opposition to abortion is not, it turns out, sharply divided
along religious or gender lines. At least by 1986, Catholics and
Protestants had almost identical attitudes toward abortion.J And
Catholic women have abortions in about the same proportion as
Protestants.4 Also, although the Church now believes that the soul
is present from the moment of conception, this has not always been
true: Aquinas, for example, believed that the soul is "infused" into
the embryo at forty or eighty days after conception, depending on
the fetus's sex.s
Despite the myth that "we would have no anti-abortion laws if
men could get pregnant," men are more favorable than women toward legalizing abortion. 6 Abortion restrictions perhaps may be
said to reinforce patriarchy, but they are not something that men
have forced upon an unwilling female population.
All of this is very interesting, but what does it have to do with
teaching constitutional law? The short answer is: enough to make
The Abortion Question worthwhile reading for anyone who teaches
the course. Many of the common misperceptions about abortion
are likely to crop up in class discussions. It is useful for a teacher to
be able to correct them.
Probably the biggest lesson of the book, however, is that the
stakes are lower in Roe v. Wade than most people think. Roe has
acquired so much drama and significance in part because so much
seems to be at stake: from one perspective, the lives of millions of
unborn children; from the other, the necessity for millions of women to bear unwanted children. The reality is that overruling Roe
would have only a marginal effect on the number of abortions. Just
as they did before Roe, many states would undoubtedly legalize
abortion without judicial mandates to do so; and even where abortions were theoretically illegal, most women would find ways to obtain them, often by traveling to states with permissive laws. 1
In all likelihood, overruling Roe would have three major effects: the price (both monetary and otherwise) of abortions would
rise; a few women, particularly the poorest and the youngest, would
3. One study did show, however, a higher percentage of Catholics among anti-abortion
activists. Id. at 30.
4. /d. at 15.
5. /d. at 2.
6. /d. at 140-41.
7. See Collins, Is There "Life" (or "Choice'') After Roe?, 3 CoN!IT. CoMM. 91 (1986);
Kaplan, Abortion as a Vice Crime-A "What If" Story, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming).
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be unable to obtain them; and a symbolic victory would be scored
by the pro-life movement. These are not insignificant effects, but
they are surely less substantial than most people on both sides
envision.
The abortion funding cases provide a good example of the gap
between judicial decision and social reality in the abortion area. In
Maher v. Roes and Harris v. McRae 9 the Court held that the government has no obligation to pay for abortions for women on welfare, even if it does pay their childbirth expenses. Justice Marshall's
dissent in Harris warned, not unreasonably, that "[i]f abortion is
medically necessary and a funded abortion is unavailable, [women]
must resort to back-alley butchers, attempt to induce an abortion
themselves by crude and dangerous methods, or suffer the serious
medical consequences of attempting to carry the fetus to term."Io
Events turned out differently:
The hope of anti-abortion groups and the fear of pro-choice groups that restrictions of federal Medicaid funding for abortion would greatly reduce the number of
abortions by poor women have not been borne out. One estimate, for a thirtymonth period between 1977 and 1980, is that 94 percent of women eligible for
Medicaid who would otherwise have obtained a legally induced abortion did in fact
do so despite federal restrictions. About one-third of the abortions were financed by
the private rather than the public sector; in many cases poor women used their own
meager resources to pay for the abortion. The early results were therefore not devastating, but they were not entirely benign. About 5 percent of the women who
desired an abortion were unable to get one and bore a child; other estimates are
much higher. About 1 percent turned to an illegal abortion. Many who did get an
abortion were delayed in the process, with an increased risk to their health. In
short, the restrictions increased the obstacles already faced by poor women in obtaining an abortion, but the increase was not dramatic. II

This does not mean, of course, that the Hyde Amendments were
innocuous, or that the Court was right about the constitutional issue. It does suggest, however, that the issue was less dramatic than
it seemed to Justice Marshall.
The Abortion Question may have some relevance to the constitutional issues involved in abortion. For example, the poll results
showing overwhelming support for legalizing abortions under some
circumstances suggest that the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is
not quite so horrendous as it might appear. The major implication
of the book for the abortion debate is more subtle. The knowledge
that less is at stake may transform the tenor rather than the substance of the debate. It may do little to change what we say in
8.
9.
10.
II.

432 u.s. 464 (1977).
448 u.s. 297 (1980).
448 U.S. at 338.
ABORTION QUESTION,

supra note I, at 156.
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arguments about Roe. But it might lead us all to lower our voices a
bit. That would be a major improvement.
D.A.F.

